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Abstract
Information adds value to transactions in three ways: it supports reputations, permits
customisation, and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was
frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or
not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced
economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. This may
help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse
of the command system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse.
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Information and Command
Without the most careful examination of all the statistical data that which
we possess in far larger measure than at any other time and in any other
country, without organising these data, without analysing them and
generalising from them, no scholarly economic work is possible. It is a
source of regret that the statistical data are still classified secret in the
Central Statistical Administration in comrade Starovskii’s safes.1
Introduction
This paper is about the value of information in a command system. Paul David and
Dominique Foray distinguish information from knowledge as follows: knowledge is
the cognitive capability that empowers its owners to act, intellectually or practically,
whereas information is merely the “structured and formatted data that remain passive
and inert” until those empowered by knowledge use it.2 On board an aircraft, the
instruments and charts provide information whereas the pilot has the knowledge of
how to fly the plane using the information. Thus information is much less than
knowledge. It is only a small part of the stock of intangible capital that is used to fly
the plane or manage society. But information is still very important. In the classic
formulation of Kenneth Arrow the value of information is that it reduces uncertainty.3
Flying in cloud or darkness, for example, the most knowledgeable pilot cannot
pinpoint the plane’s position and attitude relative to the ground without checking the
dials on the instrument panel.
In proposing the subject of information in command economies it is hard to know
where to begin. The empirical foundations for an historical study do not exist. It is not
just that we do not have measures of information, but also that we do not know how it
should be measured. There is an aggregate stock of information that depreciates
continually as information becomes outdated or irrelevant. New information is
continually added; some of it updates or replaces old information, and some of it is
new. Because information is dated and technology is changing, information of
different dates is heterogeneous. Information can be digital or analogue. Digital
information can be measured in internet pages, disk files, bytes and bits. Analogue
information that is written and bound can be measured in volumes, pages, and
characters, but analogue information also exists in film, tape, newsprint, and
manuscript. This technical heterogeneity makes the stock of information and its
growth hard to measure without ambiguity. Further, the uses of information are many;
usually we cannot even distinguish between information that serves the economy’s
productive needs and that which serves our human curiosity and is therefore a
consumption good. The value of information depends on our knowledge, and new
knowledge can have unexpected effects; it can make some kinds of information
completely obsolete, and make others suddenly valuable, for example we are
continually finding new ways of using historical information.
But for the most part we are not very good at measuring information. What we
tend to measure is not information itself but the spread of information technology, for
                                                  
1 A.I. Mikoian to the twentieth congress of the communist party of the Soviet
Union, Moscow, 16 February 1956. Vladimir Nikonovich Starovskii was chief of
TsSU (the central statistical administration of USSR Gosplan, later of the USSR
council of ministers) continuously from 21 October 1940 to 6 August 1975.
2 David and Foray (2001).
3 Arrow (1984), 106–14.
2example computer units, telephone lines, pounds of newsprint, and so on. I will try to
focus on the concept of stocks of economically valuable information of various kinds,
but the reader should not expect quick results.
The paper is organised as follows. Part 1 argues that the growing role that
information plays in modern market economies is not just a consequence of its falling
cost. The growing role of information also results from rising incomes. The evidence
shows that as economic development proceeds and incomes rise information is
demanded in much larger quantities and may even display increasing returns. Part 2
contrasts the uses of information in command and market systems. Part 3 considers
these more specifically. Information adds more value to transactions that take place
increasingly as incomes rise because it supports reputations, permits customisation,
and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not
produced; if produced, it was often concealed in “comrade Starovskii’s safes” or
elsewhere. Often it was of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced
economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. Part 4
considers the implications for Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the
collapse of the command system, and the persistence of a low level of output after the
collapse. Part 5 concludes.
1. Falling Costs, Rising Demands
We are sometimes told that we are living in a “new economy”. The basis of the new
economy is said to be the rapidly falling costs and diffusion of new technologies for
information storage, handling, and transmission from the desktop computer and
mobile phone to the internet. Other aspects of the new economy, whether or not it has
truly accelerated growth, are said to include declining old industries, the growth of
new industries producing machinery and specifically IT equipment, the rise of the
information and financial services sectors, and globalisation.4
I single out the rise of services because the products of the services sector are
relatively information–intensive. Information is a final product of the news,
entertainment, and publishing media. Agencies engaged in business consulting,
market research, credit evaluation, and economic forecasting consume it and supply it
to other business users. Information is essential to the provision of personal services
that range from education, health care, and the long–term care of sick, disabled, and
old people, to housing, labour market and financial services. Community services
such as defence, policing, the administration of justice, and public accounting rely in
obvious ways on the flow of information.
The rise of services has recently accelerated but has long historical roots. This is
one piece of evidence that supports the idea that the new economy may not be so new
and has probably been emerging for centuries. Table 1 shows that the employment
share of services in three of the most developed industrial economies has been
growing since 1870. Its growth has been continuous in the United States, whereas in
Britain and Germany the industrial efforts of World War II interrupted the trend. But
if we take 1930 as an intermediate benchmark the table also shows that the gain in the
employment share of the services sector over the last sixty years in each country was
at least twice that of the first sixty years, and this supports the idea of an underlying
acceleration of the restructuring of production towards services since World War II.
No single factor has been associated with the rise of the “new economy” more
than diffusion of the personal computer. Within twenty years the United States has
                                                  
4 For a survey of uses, leading and misleading, of the idea of a “new economy”
see Madrick (2001).
3gone from negligible availability to a position where there is one PC for every
employable adult. Other leading economies are not far behind.5
Table 1. Employment in Distribution, Finance, and Services, 1870 to 1990: the USA,
UK, and Germany, Selected Years (per cent of total employment)
United
States
United
Kingdom
Germany
1870 18.3 27.0 16.0
1910 26.2 32.3 19.5
1930 33.1 35.2 22.3
Increase, 1870 to 1930 +14.8 +8.2 +6.3
1950 40.0 31.7 21.1
1990 62.2 57.0 36.1
Increase, 1930 to 1990 +29.1 +21.8 +13.8
Source: Broadberry (1997), 64.
Current rates of decline in information and communication costs are dramatic by
any standard. For example, in the three decades from 1930 to 1960 the cost of a
three–minute transatlantic phone call fell by 5.4 per cent a year, but this rate increased
to 8.4 per cent annually in the next three decades from 1960 to 1990. In the three
decades from 1960 to 1990 the US Department of Commerce computer price deflator
fell at 14.9 per cent a year, and at 27.6 per cent a year in the 1980s alone.6 More
recent estimates show further acceleration, with performance–adjusted personal
computer prices falling at 30 to 40 per cent annually in the 1990s.7 It is a striking
irony that the years of accelerating global decline in information costs are also
roughly the period over which the Soviet economy decayed and then collapse.
There may be historical parallels in past diffusion curves of radio and television,
telegraph and postal services and mail order, and newsprint and books. The cost of
the printed word followed a similar curve in the years after the introduction of the
printing press. Before printing, a single book might represent months or years of a
scholar’s income. Only the church or the crown could maintain a library.8 With the
introduction of printing to Italy in 1465 the price of books is said to have fallen by 80
per cent in just three years. This decline was repeated in the years that followed
because falling prices then widened the market and enabled a rapid increase in
printing runs; by the early sixteenth century editions of 3000 copies were not
uncommon. After this time, however, book prices stabilised for a lengthy period.9
                                                  
5 World Bank (2001), World Development Indicators. In the United States in
1999 there were 511 PCs in use per thousand of the population, followed by Australia
(469) and Switzerland (462).
6 Calculated from figures cited by the International Monetary Fund (1997), 46.
7 Landefield and Grimm (2000), 19.
8 Bell (1936), 331; Cipolla (1956), 57–63.
9 I thank Martin Lowry for this information, based on his own research and
reference to Giovanni Andrea Bussi, Prefazioni alle edizioni di Sweynheym e
Pannartz prototipografi Romani, a cura di Massimo Miglio (Edizioni il Polifilo,
1978), and Anna Esposito, Anna Modigliani, and Paola Scarcia Piacentini, “Il costo
del libro”, in Scrittura, biblioteche e stampa a Roma nel Quattrocento, Atti del
Seminario 6–8 Maggio 1982, a c. di M. Miglio (3 vols, Citta del Vaticano 1983), vol.
II, 323–553.
4The decline in information costs during such episodes may be astonishing and
spectacular, but it is only part of the story. Conventional analysis of the information
age focuses on falling costs because our attention is naturally drawn to the historical
episodes of dramatic cost decline, one of which we are living through now. Moreover
it cannot be denied that falling costs are very, very important. However, the
relationship between information and economic growth has roots that are not only
longer in historical terms than are often imagined, but also deeper than a narrow focus
on falling costs would imply. We are not just observing a slide down a fixed demand
curve that widens the market as costs fall. The uses of information have been driven
by rising incomes as well as by falling information costs. Income growth is slow and
gradual. However, there is unambiguous evidence that information becomes more
useful as incomes rise and would be demanded in greater quantities even if costs did
not change.
Cross–country comparisons in the appendix show clearly how the demand for
information handling capacity rises with income when costs are given. This
relationship is well established and robust, and it can be observed in quite widely
separated historical periods. Already in the 1930s incomes were as strongly correlated
with the availability of information and communications facilities across countries as
with ingots of steel or kilowatts of electric power.10 Lenin and Stalin thought they
were living in the age of steel and electricity, but they were wrong: in fact a new era
was already overtaking them. Similar evidence from the present day does no more
than confirm that the age of information is not driven just by falling costs. For given
technologies available at given costs, relatively wealthy countries have found it
advantageous to invest much more heavily in information capacity than poor
countries. This may be because information is a luxury good so that rich people are
willing to spend proportionately more to obtain it, or because information has higher
returns in the activities in which rich countries specialise.
It seems likely that information displays diminishing returns when other factors
are controlled. However, network externalities clearly ensure increasing returns over
a certain range to items of information technology equipment such as video and fax
machines, telephones, and PCs.11 Further, while returns to information may strictly
diminish at the margin for a given activity, it is possible and even likely that average
returns tend to be higher in those activities such as services that grow most rapidly as
incomes rise. Hence, the value of information may rise with incomes and the level of
economic development.
2. Hierarchy and Secrecy
In order to understand the scope and purposes of information stocks in the Soviet
economy, it is necessary to note the differences between command and market
systems. In a market that is competitive the important relationships are horizontal:
buyers and sellers meet and compete on approximately equal terms. Market
information is available to all or, if costly, is itself a commodity that can be supplied
and demanded. A hierarchy is a vertical network of principals and agents.12 In the
Soviet command economy most enterprises were state owned and most producers
were agents of a government principal, usually a minister, the ministry being the legal
fundholder. Horizontal relationships of supply and demand were organised by order
from above through vertical hierarchies rather than directly between buyers and
sellers on a voluntary basis. Vertical subordination was based on the principle that
                                                  
10 Harrison (1994), 249–51. See further the figures in the appendix.
11 On network externalities see Katz and Shapiro (1985).
12 On vertical and horizontal networks see Wintrobe (1998), 212–13.
5orders flowed downwards while information flowed upwards and did not leak
downwards or sideways.
An essential feature of the Soviet command system is that its hierarchies were
complex: there were many parallel hierarchies with functions that were necessarily
specialised and often overlapping, that converged at the top in a unified leading body
such as the council of minsters and the politburo. And of course there were minor
parallel hierarchies within every major one. None of these hierarchies could fulfill its
functions in isolation, without horizontal exchanges that required contact with others.
For example the defence ministry had to purchase equipment and fuel from industry
and food from agriculture; the ministry for engineering had to buy metals from the
steel industry and power from the electricity generating industry. These exchanges
were first of all authorised in very broad outline in high–level plans and decrees, and
then the ministries themselves had to negotiate detailed contracts for specific
commodities that implemented the plan.13 Implementing these contracts rested on
budget authorisation by the ministry of finance and credit authorisation by the state
bank. Meanwhile the criminal and security police, planners, and party activists
selectively monitored activities and transactions and tracked their consequences.
Within these complex hierarchies principals were faced with two kinds of
opportunistic action on the part of agents that might restrict or dissipate the
principal’s rents. One was the agent’s ability to influence the principal arising from
the agent’s control of the upward flow of information. The other was the agent’s
ability to collude with contacts in parallel hierarchies in unauthorised horizontal
transactions that might profit the agent to the loss of the principal.
The practice of secrecy was a mechanism that effectively supported vertical
structures at the expense of horizontal ones. Secrecy itself had two aspects. One
aspect was the strict rules limiting the downward transmission of information. For
example, between 1930 and 1941 the government and its main economic committee
made more than 32 000 decrees but less than 4000 of these were openly published,
and more than 5000 received the top security classification which meant that they
remained known only to a few top officials.14 Secrecy extended both to decisions and
to the decision making process itself. The principles of “conspirativeness”
(konspiratsiia), approved by the party politburo in the late 1920s, were aimed at
limiting knowledge of the business of the politburo and central committee to the
narrowest possible set of participants and, in the process of transmitting decisions
downwards, to deny information to lower levels about the sources and context of
higher–level decisions. Moreover, on 5 March 1931 the politburo resolved
“categorically to forbid people with the right of acquaintance with the decisions of the
c[entral] c[ommittee], when passing instructions onward in the apparatus, to refer to
the fact that these instructions are decisions of the c[entral] c[ommittee]”.15
Such secrecy cannot only have been designed to prevent breaches of national
security or to prevent society from holding the government and ruling party to public
account. It was also designed to influence the behaviour of those within the state, but
below the apex of power. If officials and activists at the middle level of the
nomenklatura knew nothing of the decisions being made above them and of the
superior bodies making them, they could be prevented from learning how to shape
and direct information and lobby superiors so as to influence decisions in their own
private interests.
                                                  
13 Our knowledge of inter–ministerial contracting in the Soviet economy was
virtually non–existent before the archives. See Harrison and Simonov (2000), Belova
and Gregory (2001), and Belova (2001).
14 Davies (2001), 63.
15 Khlevniuk et al. (1995), 85; see also 73–82.
6Another aspect of secrecy was the construction of elaborate firewalls within the
state to inhibit horizontal transfers of information among the parallel hierarchies.
Again, these firewalls could hardly have been justified on grounds of national
security or even by a desire to protect the authority of the state as a whole over
society. Even within the government information was shared on the basis of need, not
right to know, and the need to know was defined within limits that appear sometimes
extraordinarily narrow. For example, in August 1948 the deputy chief of the interior
ministry (MVD) Ivan Serov wrote to his boss Lavrentii Beriia that in the process of
drafting the 1949 budget the ministry of finance was demanding to be informed of
numbers in prisons, labour camps, and prisoner of war camps “and their physical
condition”, numbers of internal security troops, and figures for gold output and the
gold content of ores; these figures were required to budget for the required outlays by
the MVD on wages and subsistence. Serov warned: “Provision of these figures will
lead to familiarisation with especially important information on the part of a wide
circle of staff of the USSR Ministry of Finance, the State Bank and the Industrial
Bank”. An accompanying memorandum advised Beriia that in past years such figures
were loaned temporarily to the finance ministry to be processed by no more than two
or three highly trusted workers, then returned; it noted that the ministries of the armed
forces and state security provided the finance ministry only with financial summaries,
not head counts; and it proposed that from now on the MVD do the same.16
Such firewalls were often buttressed by a low–trust environment that helped to
align agents’ incentives with those of their principals. For example, the archives show
that in the 1930s industrial producers of military products frequently refused to
release information about the production cost of weapons to the defence ministry,
which was the purchasing department. They justified this on the grounds that
equipment costs were a military secret that the defence ministry was not entitled to
know, but of course this was a crude excuse: they did so simply because it promoted
their horizontal bargaining power.17
A number of interlocking mechanisms thus inhibited horizontal transactions.
Unauthorised contracts among lower level agents to engage in horizontal trades were
prohibited and were not legally enforceable. In addition vertical networks of
patronage and protection encouraged agents to invest in relationships of trust and
dependence with superiors rather than with their opposite numbers in parallel
hierarchies.
By protecting their information from horizontal spillage principals successfully
strengthened their vertical hierarchies. However, the reinforcement of hierarchy was
achieved at a cost, and this cost was paid in the diminished quantity and quality of
information that flowed upwards from agent to principal. Quantities of information
that flowed upward were limited by the common interest of both principal and agent.
The upper reaches of the hierarchies had a very limited information handling
capacity. This was only partly because of technological limits, although it should not
be forgotten that until the end of the Soviet regime many officials had nothing more
sophisticated on their desks than an abacus. In addition, the politburo and ministers
positively preferred to rely on small expert staffs; evidently this made it easier to
share motivation and sustain unified leadership.18 There were many kinds of
information that the commanders of the system simply did not want to know; they did
                                                  
16 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, fond 5446, op. 50a,
delo 4043, folios 1–2. On Serov’s memorandum is noted by hand: “Comrades Popov
and Serov: consider and resolve. L. Beriia”. I thank Oleg Khlevniuk for this
reference. For a similar example from the 1930s see Harrison (2001a), 96.
17 Harrison and Simonov (2000), 232–5, and further Barber et al. (2000), 19–23.
18 Gregory (2001), 14–16.
7not want to be bothered with every petty setback or failure, preferring to place
responsibility on those at lower levels to sort things out without the assistance of
higher authority. But it also suited those at lower levels to preserve their own freedom
of action by keeping their superiors underinformed.19
Vertical relations also worked to spoil the quality of information. Because
profitable opportunities for horizontal exchanges that undermined the plan were
everywhere, principals needed good information about what their agents were doing.
For the same reason, however, agents had strong incentives to conceal or lie about
their activities. And for another reason too: even if the returns to concealed horizontal
exchanges were sometimes low relative to the high risks and penalties involved, the
most profitable alternative for the agent was not necessarily to obey orders, because
carrying out instructions also required effort, and doing nothing required just as much
concealment as doing something that was actively illegal. Thus, although downward
and horizontal transfers of information were successfully impeded, the flows of
information vertically upward became sluggish and were frequently distorted.20
While principals appear to have discouraged inferiors from lobbying in general,
under specific circumstances they encouraged it because it helped to overcome the
reluctance of agents to volunteer information. In a context of competition for
resources and favours, rival agents were all too willing to supply principals with
information of two kinds: about the relative worth of competing spending projects
that were available for the principal to select, and about the relative loyalty of
competing agents. This strategy was followed, for example, to create a “market for
inventions” in the defence industry.21 The information resulting could be plentiful,
though recognisably biased. Its supply depended on enforcing rivalry among agents at
lower levels through a policy of “divide and rule”; if they formed horizontal links and
learnt to collude, the flow of information was worsened in both quantity and quality.22
In summary, the role of information was quite different in the command system
compared with a market setting. Specifically, principals had strong incentives to
collect true information but these incentives were substantially weakened by the high
costs of collecting and handling it. Agents often had only weak incentives to collect
information or provide true information to principals, and strong incentives either to
withhold or distort it. The equilibrium outcome was characterised by limited
information stocks of poor quality.
3. Market Information in a Command System
The tradition of Austrian economics emphasises the role of markets as information
systems in which prices enable reallocation by acting as signals.23 Indeed this
provided the argument by which that tradition sought to establish the superiority of
the capitalist economic system over socialism. The focus of this paper is a little
different: it deals with various ways in which the exchange of non–price signals can
add value to transactions. Without this information the transactions that take place
would either be of lower value or would not take place at all. I distinguish three ways
in which information adds value to transactions: it supports producers’ and
                                                  
19 Belova and Gregory (2001).
20 As a result the detailed information that reached the summit was sometimes not
trusted as a basis for planning decisions and supra–ministerial agencies incurred costs
in gathering data independently to duplicate and cross–check that supplied through
the ministerial hierarchy. See Gregory (1990), 37–8.
21 Harrison (2001b), (2001c).
22 Harrison (2001d).
23 Hayek (1945).
8consumers’ reputations, permits customisation of products, and provides yardsticks
that are useful to all agents in comparative evaluation of products, producers, and
investments. Reputation and customisation depend on the diffusion of specific
information, that is information about individual consumers and producers.
Yardsticks on the other hand are enabled by “general knowledge”, that is knowledge
about the economy in various aggregate dimensions.
3.1. Brands, Advertising, and Reputation
In markets for goods and services where there are many brands and many sellers,
advertising informs consumers of the availability and price of new products and
reduces their costs of searching.24 Where the quality of a product matters and
consumers cannot easily tell good products from bad ones before purchase, producers
can command a premium if they invest in a good reputation.25 However, for the same
reasons that Soviet producers did not need to know their markets, they had little
reason to acquire reputation with the final users of their products. For related reasons
producers did not advertise: Most Soviet consumers took what they could get without
having to choose among brands or to seek out the lowest price. It was enough to be
able to buy at all.
In a seller’s market the information of most value to consumers was to know for
certain that a given commodity would be available in given quantity at a given time
and place. Knowledge of availability was more important than knowledge of quality
or even price. Market research that predicted availability would have served
consumers, but was of no interest to producers. Without it, such market intelligence
was circulated on the twin basis of rumour and privilege, and was traded within the
“economy of favours”.26
It would be wrong to conclude that business reputation did not exist at all in the
command system. Reputations were attached to both products and agents. Particular
branded products were widely known for high quality: for example Stolichnaia
vodka, Red October chocolate confectionery, the Bolshoi ballet, and MiG aircraft.
This reputation was based primarily on consumers’ experience, but the payoff came
from reporting this experience within the vertical hierarchy. The market reputation
brought no return; it was the reputation in the hierarchy that won rewards for the
producers. These rewards were extremely varied. Organisational team benefits took
the form of priority access to financial and material resources for production and the
establishment of privileged retail, housing, and welfare clubs for employees.
Individual benefits ranged from cash premia and state decorations awarded to leading
individuals to the chance to travel abroad and retain some foreign earnings.
What factors formed the business reputation of an agent? Again reputation could
be formed on both horizontal and vertical lines; however, whereas the market
reputation of a product reinforced its reputation in the hierarchy, the reputation of an
agent was formed in a more complicated way.
Agents’ reputation with superiors was formed by both productivity and loyalty,
but the weighting of these two factors was variable and the size of the return was
uncertain as well. For example, a study of Soviet regional policy has shown that
Stalin used investment allocations to reward loyal agents in the regions in his struggle
with the opposition in the late 1920s; during the 1930s, however, his regional agents
were called to account for their wasteful use of these resources.27 A detailed study of
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25 According to Stigler (1961), 224, “Reputation commands a price […] because
it economizes on search”. For elaboration see Shapiro (1983).
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27 Harris (1999).
9the Soviet allocation system for motor vehicles in the 1930s also shows that the
dictator held a stock of vehicles in reserve for use as rewards for loyal agents.28 In
aviation research and development, in contrast, although Stalin had clear favourites
and proposals required investments in lobbying to gain initial finance, a reputation for
loyalty was no protection against deprivation of funding and sometimes also
punishment in the event of productive failure.29 Thus it appears that under Stalin
loyalty alone was not enough. Perhaps, however, the slowdown of elite circulation
that followed the dictator’s death permitted an increase in the importance of loyalty
relative to that of productivity, with adverse consequences for the health of the
command system.
In unauthorised horizontal contacts the ability to complete transactions depended
on a business reputation for plain dealing and keeping one’s word. Eugenia Belova
has described the unauthorised “relational” contracting system that arose where
contracts were costly to enforce or unenforceable by other means.30 Relational
contracts typically rested on a handshake and were enabled by experience of personal
contact and friendship; only these could overcome the culture of low trust.31
An agent could exploit a good horizontal reputation to support a vertical
reputation. Vertical reputation rested on fulfilling the plan, but the plan was highly
aggregated and did not foresee many specific details of the inter–ministerial
transactions necessary to achieve it. The system of inter–ministerial contracting that
underpinned the aggregate plan was also highly incomplete. In order to supplement
the plan and eventually fulfill it agents were frequently compelled to make
unauthorised horizontal contacts and deals. Thus a horizontal reputation for honesty
among equals could support a vertical reputation for serving superiors. This created a
problem for principals, however, who could not easily distinguish those unofficial
deals that agents made so as to fulfill the plan from those that helped agents to line
their own pockets and so subverted the state. Perhaps an agent’s horizontal reputation
could be “too good”: to be well thought of by everyone could too easily be a cover for
embezzlement or worse.
Similarly, a vertical reputation that was “too good” could damage horizontal
reputation. Eugenia Belova finds evidence that a bad vertical reputation could signal a
readiness to do unofficial business on horizontal lines. While relational contracting
should have become more efficient as personal networks increased in scope, she
argues, it was not in the interest of principals to allow such horizontal networks to
expand without limit. As a result horizontal reputation could only accumulate
privately or within small groups.32
In market economies a further dimension of reputation is information about
specific consumers. Consumer reputation is important primarily for consumer credit.
Banks, loan societies, and credit card agencies prefer to lend only to individuals with
desirable characteristics such as fixed places of residence, collateral assets, and good
repayment records. In the Soviet command system these things were mostly
unimportant. Without a freehold property market no one wanted to acquire a housing
mortgage. Consumer debt did not arise either; in a shortage economy most consumers
had plenty of liquidity in the form of either cash assets or waiting time.
Individuals’ status as producers and their political reputation with superiors
carried more weight than any financial credit rating. Another way of putting this
                                                  
28 Lazarev and Gregory (2001).
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30 Belova (2001).
31 Gregory (1990), 91–2.
32 Belova (2001).
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would be to say that the currency in which people were rated for credit worthiness
and were able to accumulate debts was measured in loyalty and favours. This
“currency” was traded privately subject to special rules of reciprocity and was not
convertible into rubles. The information on the basis of which this trade took place
was correspondingly private and not available for dissemination to others.
3.2. Customisation
In the early twentieth century, mass production brought the cost of consumer durables
down to the point where they could become items of mass consumption. The result
was a high degree of market penetration by relatively uniform, standardised products.
Henry Ford said of his family automobiles: “You can have any color you want, as
long as it’s black”.33 The same went for radio, telephone, and television sets. At lower
incomes price tended naturally to be more important than variety, although when
controlling for income consumers in different countries still differed somewhat in
their willingness to trade off variety or quality.34
In market economies customised products are able to command a premium over
standardised, mass–produced commodities. But customisation implies a great
increase in the exchange of information required to complete a transaction. In the era
of mass production the consumer bought a uniform product in the combination of
attributes determined by the producer. Today flexible production means that, by
recombining their attributes in different ways, suppliers can customise goods and
services to the needs of individual purchasers without loss of economies of scale.
Mass customisation, sometimes also called “mass personalisation” is enabled by
the increased information that producers can obtain about consumers. In wealthy
countries today big companies carry out market research, or employ specialised
research agencies, to develop huge databases that store household– or individual–
level data about characteristics and preferences. For more complex products
consumers themselves provide the information about their preferences “just in time”.
For example a buyer ordering a computer over the internet specifies the processor
make and speed, chip and disk memory, additional drives, modem capacity, display
type, sound card, multi–media facilities, and so on; this information is then
transmitted directly to the assembly line programme.
In the Soviet economy information about product prices and characteristics was
not readily available in such detail. Indeed it may not even have been produced. For
example the Soviet statistical archives appear to hold price and quantity information
about every product ever produced in a state–owned enterprise, but even for the most
complex and costly machinery this information does not appear to extend to more
than two or three product characteristics.35 By comparison the marketing and mail
order catalogues available to most American consumers from the early twentieth
century onward convey many times this quantity of information per product. The
information provided was not only enough to sell the products but also to support
subsequent studies of hedonic pricing of durable goods that have routinely used such
catalogues for their primary data.36 In contrast the information held in the Soviet
archives was collected specifically to support planning targets based on quality–
                                                  
33 This is what Henry Ford is said to have said in 1929, or in 1933, or at some
other date, of the Model A, the Model T, or some other Ford vehicle, according to
hundreds of internet references registered by www.google.com.
34 Broadberry (1997), 77–89.
35 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki, fond 1562, contains the files of
the USSR central statistical administration (TsSU SSSR) that have been declassified
up to 1963.
36 For example Gordon (1990), especially 417–89.
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adjusted pricing but did not in fact do so; on the contrary, it permitted concealed
inflation. 37
Similarly, Soviet producers did not need or carry out market research into
consumer characteristics. Mass production displaced the artisan system of producer–
driven customisation in the 1930s and 1940s.38 Thereafter, the Soviet economy
remained wedded to mass production. Standardised clothing, household durables, and
civilian and military machinery supplied an undifferentiated market. The state
procured and distributed output, breaking the link between supplier and final
purchaser. The seller’s market left producers with no incentive to become informed
about the market, and no means of doing so because the state insulated them from
market responses. The state monopoly of foreign trade cut producers off from the
export market even more thoroughly than from the home market, and exporters were
given no special incentives to tailor production to the requirements of foreign
buyers.39 Only the defence ministry had the power to enforce customisation upon
producers through its institutionalised presence in defence industry and power of veto
in the procurement process.40
In practice there were two ways in which Soviet products and services could
command a real premium in return for variation of attributes. The first was provided
by the command economy, which allocated an implicit premium to new and regraded
products by pricing them favourably in relation to existing products. This was not a
deliberate policy but arose as follows: plan prices were based on product costs so as
not to reward cost cutting at the expense of product quality, but the authorities could
not process complex information about product quality so as to distinguish cost
increases associated with the customisation of products to the market from those
designed to attract a rent at the expense of society. Thus “simulated” innovation paid
more than true innovation, and producers obtained rewards for product variations that
increased costs rather than quality.41
The other way in which products and services could command a return on varied
attributes was through illegal trade and side payments. In these respects the Soviet
economy returned the concept of customisation to an artisan framework of semi–legal
or illegal self–employment or unregulated small–scale trade. For example, in the
market for commodities western imports were one source of customised products that
could command a premium. To the consumer the main positive attribute of western
clothing or household equipment was simply that these were different from the
standardised Soviet article. The premium payable was reduced, however, because
access to imported commodities depended on privilege more than purchasing power.
Thus the possibility of buying denim jeans from tourists was restricted mainly to
those with a Moscow or Leningrad residence permit. Similarly, personal services
from housing maintenance to medical care were often customised to the individual
consumer through bribery and side payments, but in the “economy of favours” being
able to trade a privilege could count more than purchasing power.
3.3. “General Knowledge” and Yardsticks
In market economies specific transactions are enabled by combining different kinds
of information. Information that is specific to the transaction (“What am I buying?
How much does it cost? How much do I need it?”) is essential but often specific
information alone is not enough. To complete the transaction general knowledge is
                                                  
37 Harrison (1998a), (2000a).
38 On mass production in defence industry see Harrison (2000b).
39 Holzman (1974).
40 Harrison and Simonov (2000).
41 Berliner (1976), 375–80; Harrison (1998a).
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required as well. Are similar products available elsewhere for less? What other
products are available? For durable goods time will also enter the equation: will the
price fall? Will something substantially better come along in a year or two? Will
needs change? Typically problems that involve time, such as investment choices or
providing for retirement, are especially demanding of general knowledge. Producers
must forecast aggregate trends as well as those specific to their own market.
Individuals must predict their lifetime capacity to save and the lifetime return to
saving in the context of macroeconomic and demographic trends.
In all these cases we use general knowledge of trends in the economy as a whole
to provide yardsticks against which we can judge individual firms and products.42 For
example we may judge product prices against the retail price index, share
performance against the Wall Street index, or fixed–interest financial products against
the Bank of England’s discount rate.
Yardsticks also play an essential role in informing policy choices and choices in
political markets. We rank police forces by crime and detection rates and use this
information to judge chief police officers. We judge health administrators by waiting
lists and operation success rates in hospital league tables, teachers by pupils’ exam
performance in league tables of schools, and politicians by the economy’s place in
league tables of unemployment, inflation, real growth, and environmental quality. An
external yardstick for the Soviet economy in this sense was sometimes the economic
performance of the west, as when Stalin set the goal to “make good the distance we
are lagging behind the advanced capitalist countries” or “to outstrip the principal
capitalist countries economically”.43 Soviet leaders also benchmarked their own
technologies against specific western products and processes; Stalin himself
sometimes withheld support from new ideas until they had been tested by Western
experience.44
Such use of general knowledge can result in intense pressure on the independence
and objectivity of those who produce it: business consortia, academic organisations,
and government bureaucracies.45 The pressure is facilitated in so far as each has a
natural monopoly in the supply of information about themselves that cannot easily be
checked. Therefore the structure of the market for statistics has an important
influence on their quality. To assure this quality usually requires a combination of
transparent sources and methods, regulation through audit, and constitutional
guarantees of independence from operational concerns.
In the Soviet economy information of a general character was frequently not
produced; if produced it was often concealed in “comrade Starovskii’s safes” or
                                                  
42 Shleifer (1985) proposed “yardstick competition” as a means of regulating
franchised monopolies. Franchised monopolies typically have little incentive to
reduce costs. However, if the price that the regulated firm receives is made to depend
on the costs of identical firms, then in equilibrium each firm will choose a socially
efficient level of cost reduction. Yardstick competition is recognisable in a Soviet
context as the idea behind “socialist emulation”, with the difference that Soviet
competition were aimed not at cutting costs but at increasing gross output.
43 “The Tasks of Business Executives” (4 February 1931) and “Report on the
Work of the Central Committee” to the eighteenth party congress (10 March 1939),
both reproduced in Stalin (1940), quoting from pages 367 and 634 respectively. For a
survey and history of Soviet expert attempts to benchmark the Soviet economy
against western yardstick see Kudrov (1997).
44 Holloway (1994), 147.
45 In the terms of Arrow (1984), 142, yardstick information is indivisible and
inappropriable. It is a public good by definition and this explains why it is not
typically supplied on a private basis.
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elsewhere; if not concealed, its quality was usually poor. Moreover, the quality of
statistical information was usually unchecked: the government statistical service was
allowed to exercise a monopoly over statistical work, and was itself an obedient
instrument of the political class.46
The Soviet propensity for concealment in general hardly requires further
explanation. What matters for now is specifically the concealment of information that
would have usefully contributed to general knowledge, for example crime rates, rates
of alcoholism, disease and death rates, harvest levels, the money supply, and real
growth and inflation rates were all on the secret list at one time or another.
The importance of this kind of concealment is that it inhibited the establishment
of yardsticks by which the performance of government and the economy could be
evaluated; in this way it diminished accountability. It also resulted in two kinds of
waste. First, in the absence of yardsticks some people made costly mistakes; for
example, many Russians counted on the command system to provide them with
pensions in retirement and saved less for their old age than they might have
otherwise, or saved in the wrong form, in rubles that are now worthless; as a result
they are now unable to retire, or live in poverty. Second, those for whom yardstick
information mattered had to use resources unnecessarily in order to duplicate it, for
example disseminating information about society by costly samizdat.47
Soviet yardsticks were not all concealed consistently. The propensity for
suppression followed a protracted cycle from relative openness in the 1920s to the
almost total statistical blackout of 1937 to 1956, followed by a return to greater
openness in the 1960s and 1970s, always with qualifications and partial retreats until
the flood of revelations associated with glasnost'.
Why were such facts revealed in some periods but not in others? There appear to
have been three reasons. First, without providing general information from time to
time the regime could not credibly claim responsibility for economic advances and
thus hope to win the population’s loyalty.48 Thus, a regime choice that shifted the
underpinnings of power away from repression towards loyalty could tip the balance in
favour of a policy of revelation that would allow the establishment of performance
yardsticks. Second, for the same reason at times of regime change it often suited a
new leader to reveal the failings of the old ones in order to blame them and avoid
carrying responsibility for their failures. Third, at times when the regime chose to
seek wider involvement of the intelligentsia in solving economic and cultural
problems greater openness became necessary in order to foster critical discussion and
evaluation of existing policies. All three motives were evident in the spring of 1956 in
Mikoian’s public plea to “comrade Starovskii” to open his safes.
In one respect a command system that practised a degree of statistical openness
might be regarded as providing better information than a market economy. The
information that is needed to make optimal production and consumption decisions
includes information about the future prices of commodities but in market economies
such futures markets mostly do not exist. The command system did not provide
information about future prices, but it did at least provide guidelines about future
quantities in the shape of detailed plans for future national economic development.49
                                                  
46 Wheatcroft and Davies (1994).
47 Arrow (1984), 143, specifies a third cost of secrecy when secrets can be traded
privately, the destruction of markets for sharing risks. In the Soviet case such markets
were precluded anyway.
48 For the underlying theoretical argument see Wintrobe (1990), 857, 864.
49 “Even as a graduate student”, writes Arrow (1984), 160, “I was somewhat
surprised at the emphasis on static allocative efficiency by market socialists, when the
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In practice, however, this information was of limited value since plans were not
implemented in any detail. In the words of Eugene Zaleski the Stalinist plan was a
“vision of growth […] The Soviet experiment shows that, in order to exert a real
influence, the vision does not have to be very accurate”.50
In periods of greater openness a problem was that much of the information
revealed even about the present and the past was itself of very low quality and
unreliable as a basis for making decisions. The very fact that Soviet statistics were
designed to be used as success indicators led to their distortion in ways that are now
well known.51 Some observers have made very large claims about the consequences
of low–quality macroeconomic yardsticks in Soviet history. For example, Grigorii
Khanin has argued that exaggerated claims to success made the Soviet regime
complacent about economic stability, encouraged an official belief in the ability of
society to shoulder fresh burdens, and inhibited necessary adaptations to changing
economic requirements in the 1970s and 1980s.52 From the standpoint of official data,
the worsening of Soviet economic conditions remained largely invisible; serious
long–term problems were admitted, but no crisis. Meanwhile, unofficial experience
told all too clearly of the sharply worsening quality and availability of goods and
services. Soviet leaders’ reliance on official yardsticks, which blanked out the true
picture and shielded them from the necessity to act, explains the uncomprehending
complacency. The upsurge of economic discontent, followed by a turn to terminal
disintegration, simply took them by surprise.
Khanin has shown that at least some who participated in the making of policy
understood the defective character of their information and tried to improve it.53 They
were opposed, however, by strongly entrenched interests that were vested in
distortion and concealment. With hindsight we see that the “errors” that resulted were
a permanent feature of the Soviet command system: distorted statistics suited the
policy biases that led to famine and demographic disaster in the 1930s, and to less
dramatic but still costly losses in the postwar period.
4. Soviet Growth, Transition, and Information
At the twentieth party congress in 1956 Mikoian claimed that the Soviet state
possessed statistical data “in far larger measure than at any other time and in any
other country”. Can he have told the truth?
In a superficial sense, possibly, yes. Our growing acquaintance with the archives
is showing us that the statistical resources of the Soviet state were very, very large.
However, the scale of these resources should be discounted by two factors: first, the
sheer size of the Soviet economy and, second, the fact that the Soviet state combined
government with functions undertaken in market economies by the private sector.
When this is done the balance of advantage becomes less clear. Moreover, most
Soviet information that was collected was restricted to a narrow sphere of circulation,
and most of it was unreliable. Many kinds of information were not collected at all or,
if collected, were not disseminated. For most of the time most officials had little idea
                                                                                                                                    
nonexistence of markets for future goods under capitalism seemed to me a much
more obvious target”.
50 Zaleski (1971), 297.
51 Nove (1958); Treml and Hardt (1972); Davies and Wheatcroft (1994).
“Goodhart’s law” (see Goodhart, 1984, 96) states: “any observed statistical regularity
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes”, in the
Soviet case, for example, the relationship between observed and true real output.
52 Khanin (1991), 41–51.
53 Khanin (1991), 51–102.
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about the true value of the physical and human resources at their disposal, the true
productivity of the producers that they commanded or the true degree of satisfaction
of the firms and households that they supplied. In short, the Soviet command system
forced economic growth on the basis of an information stock of relatively low quality
and low value.
Soviet and Russian postwar economic growth displays four features that demand
explanation: rapid growth from the 1920s through the 1950s; the slowdown that
began in the 1960s and set in more strongly in the 1970s; the collapse at the end of
the 1980s, and the persistence of a low level of real output in the 1990s and since
then. The Soviet economy’s restricted information capacity can contribute to
explaining all four. At the same time, given the present state of our knowledge, its
explanatory power looks low. This is because all four problems already have too
many possible solutions.54 It does not seem particularly useful to propose an extra
solution to each problem when the data available do not allow us to discriminate
among the solutions that have been advanced already. However, it may help to
outline some possible avenues for further investigation.
Given low–value information stocks, how did the Soviet economy grow rapidly
up to and through the 1950s? Soviet economic growth was based on the rapid
expansion of output of standardised goods and services (but mostly goods) with low
information requirements. Let me emphasise: it is not part of my argument that this
growth was an illusion. The Soviet economy did grow. It grew in real terms and by
several times over several decades. On the best measures available, between the
1920s and the 1980s Soviet real incomes per head increased by a factor of
approximately five times.55 Real consumption grew by less, however, and the extra
welfare gained from the growing supply of consumer goods and services was clearly
lessened by shortages and other restrictions on variety and choice, and by social and
intertemporal inequalities. Moreover, although the level of the information stock may
have been low relative to real output, it was presumably possible to widen this stock
as output grew so that information shortages did not constrain growth. The outcome
was that by the 1980s the Soviet Union had achieved an income level many times
higher than could have been predicted from its endowment with information handling
equipment measured by computing power.56
New research on long–run trends in the organisation of market economies
suggests that the conditions under which the Soviet economy could grow like this
were temporary. The century from 1870 to 1970 was characterised by two special
conditions in which large hierarchical organisations could flourish: industry was
providing a rising scale of production, while the modern office had reduced costs of
information and monitoring to a level that was, as yet, “neither prohibitive nor
trivial”. Since then, however, further declines in information costs have favoured a
switch away from hierarchies back to horizontally organised networks based on trust,
                                                  
54 For a survey and investigation of competing explanations of Soviet economic
growth and postwar slowdown see Harrison (1998b); for various explanations of
Soviet economic collapse and a proposed solution see Harrison (2002).
55 Maddison (1995).
56 See Iacopetta (2001) for this finding and a new investigation and analysis of the
Soviet postwar failure to adopt new information technologies. The classic general
investigation of the poor Soviet innovation record is Berliner (1976). To judge from
the relevant panel of figure 2 in the appendix, in 1997 the gap between Russian
incomes and computing power had been eliminated by the collapse of incomes.
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reputation, and customised production.57 In short, the Soviet model of rapid
industrialisation that relied on standardisation and sparse information was favoured
by special conditions of the last century that no longer exist.
The character of Soviet information stocks may help explain Soviet postwar
productivity slowdown. The evidence of the Soviet real growth series is that there
was a sharp deceleration in the mid–1970s that cannot be explained by any exogenous
shock.58 This was just the time when in other countries information costs began to fall
much more rapidly and at the same time demand shifted more decisively towards
more information–intensive products and services. Globally perhaps the return to
information was increasing relative to other resources such as labour and other kinds
of capital where returns were falling. Suppose that Soviet information channels could
not be deepened to supply the information that would have maintained the returns to
other factors in the Soviet economy. Then, a slowdown of aggregate and productivity
growth was the inevitable result.
Consider more specifically how information relates to knowledge. Knowledge in
the sense of “how to” and “can do” is useless without information. Decade after
decade the Soviet education system increased the numbers of knowledgeable people
whose desire for information was perhaps increasingly frustrated.59 As a result the
returns to investments in human capital fell or proved unexpectedly low.
The low value of Soviet information stocks may also add to our understanding of
how the Soviet command system eventually collapsed. According to Mancur Olson a
dictator of the stationary–bandit type will invest in public goods such as protection of
the physical and human assets under his control up to the point where his share in
their return to society equals the cost to him of doing so.60 Public information is a
public good but if information is costly and the return on publication accrues mainly
to society the dictator will keep it to himself or not provide it. The dictator
administers his assets through agents. Each agent will stay loyal to the dictator
provided his share in the dictator’s expected rents from the assets he administers
exceeds the expected value of the asset if he stole it. Among these assets must be
counted the dictator’s secrets. These secrets had a value to the dictator if kept, and a
value in the economic or political market place if disclosed. One aspect of the process
that began with glasnost' and ended in the dismantling of the Soviet state was the
moment when agents began to realise that the market value of state secrets long
preserved under their control exceeded their value if left in concealment. At this point
stealing information became one more dimension of what Steven Solnick has called
“stealing the state”.61
Finally, the inheritance of a low–value information stock may help to explain the
persistence of a low level of output after the transition to a market system. The
important role of intangible “social capital” in long run economic development has
                                                  
57 Broadberry and Ghosal (2001a, 2001b), and Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin
(2000) from which the quoted words are taken. I thank Stephen Broadberry for many
discussions on these issues.
58 Harrison (1998b).
59 The idea that the spread of education would eventually force a more open
society in the USSR is not new; see for example Deutscher (1967), 59–60: “The force
of the revolutionary tradition has been great enough to compel the bureaucracy to
give the workers much more education than has been required on narrow economic
grounds, and perhaps more than is safe for the privileged groups. It may be argued
that the bureaucracy is thus breeding its own grave–diggers”.
60 Olson (1993).
61 Solnick (1998).
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long been accepted by economic historians.62 More recently the poor economic
performance of the former Soviet republics since the collapse of the command system
has been attributed to low social capital in the form of an institutional quality
deficit.63 Earlier optimism about the growth prospects of transitional economies is
necessarily tempered when this deficit is fully taken into account.64 The command
system impeded the accumulation of social capital but could force economic growth
by relying on coercion instead. Now that the command system has gone, a market
economy will not prosper in Russia until the necessary accumulation of social capital
has taken place, a process that could take decades or centuries.
Social capital is conventionally measured along several dimensions: education
and knowledge, the rule of law and property rights, a civil society, and so on. What
makes these things “social” rather than private in nature is that their benefits spill
over the narrow limits of private profit and loss. In this sense information stocks are
also a part of social capital. The Russian economy today is suffering from a shortage
of the information stocks that make transactions valuable and make markets work.
Accumulating the missing information stocks will take time, and will not even begin
without progress in the complementary dimensions of social capital that are already
recognised in the literature.
5. Conclusions
The economics of information analyses some of the ways in which information adds
value to transactions in market economies. In the Soviet command economy such
information was frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed;
whether concealed or not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command
system forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information
stock. This may help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and
slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of low output
since the collapse. At the moment, however, such suggestions are no more than
speculations because we have virtually no empirical measures of trends in the
quantity or value of the command system’s information stocks, flows, or transfers.
                                                  
62 Abramowitz (1986).
63 World Bank (1996).
64 Crafts and Kaiser (2002).
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Figure 1. Information and GDP Across Countries, 1937
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Sources and Notes. Information indicators are from Ehrlich (1968). GDP figures are from Maddison (1995), who gives Soviet
GDP per head in 1937 as $2156 at “Geary–Khamis” prices of 1990. The USSR is circled; other observations are provided by
high and middle income countries in western and eastern Europe, north and south America, Japan, and Australia.
Figure 2. Information and GDP Across Countries, 1997
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